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HOLISTIC REVIEW IN RACE-CONSCIOUS UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 
 
Introduction 
The Supreme Court has held that race may be considered as “a factor of a factor of a 
factor” within a “holistic” program of university admissions if the university can satisfy a heavy 
burden of proving that the program is “narrowly tailored” to achieve the educational benefits of 
diversity.1 The Court has listed the desired benefits of racial diversity, but it has not discussed 
what evidence a university needs to prove that its program is “narrowly tailored” to achieve 
those benefits.  
This article addresses that issue. The field of psychology offers abundant research about 
the process of judgment and decision-making (“JDM”) and testing the validity of any particular 
program of decision-making. This knowledge offers valuable insights about how a university can 
design and, later, measure the validity of its admissions process so that it is “narrowly tailored” 
to achieve the educational benefits of racial diversity approved by the Supreme Court.  
Part I describes the standard that the Court has laid down for race-conscious admissions 
programs. Part II reviews the JDM literature on holistic and disaggregated decision-making. Part 
III discusses how the conclusions of this literature can guide the courts in applying the standard 
of review laid down by the Supreme Court. 
 
I. The Supreme Court’s Standard for Race-Conscious University Admissions 
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke the Supreme Court held that 
"attainment of a diverse student body ... is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of 
higher education.”2 Subsequent cases confirmed the constitutional validity of this goal.3 
In Fisher v. University of Texas4 Abigail Fisher, a student rejected for admission to the 
University of Texas – Austin (“UT”), challenged the school’s admissions system as racially 
discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.5 Although 
                                                          
1 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S.Ct 2198, 2207 (2016) (Fisher II). 
2 Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311 (1978). 
3 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (“Today, we hold that the Law School has a compelling 
interest in attaining a diverse student body.”). 
4 Fisher II; Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013) (Fisher I). 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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UT admitted that it considered race in its admissions decisions, it claimed that it did so as just 
one of many factors in a holistic review carefully designed to obtain the educational benefits of 
diversity as sanctioned by Bakke.6 
In its first encounter with the case (“Fisher I”) the Court reiterated the validity of 
diversity as an educational goal: “The attainment of a diverse student body . . . serves values 
beyond race alone, including enhanced classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation 
and stereotypes.”7 In Grutter v. Bollinger the Court had stated that “a permissible goal . . . 
require[s] only a good-faith effort . . . to come within a range demarcated by the goal itself.”8 
However, in Fisher I the Court found that  
the District Court and the Court of Appeals had “confined the strict scrutiny 
inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to the University’s good faith in its use 
of racial classifications.” . . .  The Court remanded the case, with instructions to 
evaluate the record under the correct standard and to determine whether the 
University had made “a showing that its plan is narrowly tailored to achieve” the 
educational benefits that flow from diversity. . . .  On remand, the Court of 
Appeals determined that the program conformed with the strict scrutiny mandated 
by Fisher I.9 
Reviewing this decision in Fisher II, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth 
Circuit. In so doing, it said: “Once a university gives ‘a reasoned, principled explanation’ for its 
decision, deference must be given ‘to the University’s conclusion, based on its experience and 
expertise, that a diverse student body would serve its educational goals.’”10 The Court reiterated 
its statement in Grutter that enrolling a diverse student body “promotes cross-racial 
understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables students to better understand 
persons of different races” and that “student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and 
better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society.”11 
However: “Strict scrutiny requires the university to demonstrate with clarity that its 
‘purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the 
classification is necessary . . . to the accomplishment of its purpose.’”12 Moreover: “Fisher I 
clarified that no deference is owed when determining whether the use of race is narrowly tailored 
                                                          
6 Fisher II, 136 S.Ct at 2207. 
7 Fisher I, 133 S.Ct. at 2417-18. 
8 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335 (2003) (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 
495 (1986)). 
9 Fisher II, 136 S.Ct. at 2208 (internal citations omitted). 
10 Fisher II, 136 S.Ct. at 2208. See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (“The Law School’s educational 
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”). 
11 Id. at 2210, quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
12 Id. at 2208, quoting Fisher I, 133 S.Ct. at 2418. See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-27 (“all governmental 
uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny”). 
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to achieve the university’s permissible goals.”13 And, “asserting an interest in the educational 
benefits of diversity writ large is insufficient. A university’s goals cannot be elusory or 
amorphous—they must be sufficiently measurable to permit judicial scrutiny of the policies 
adopted to reach them.”14 “The purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure that ‘the 
means chosen “fit” . . . th[e] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that 
the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.’” 15 
This is consistent with the Court’s statement in Fisher I that “’the mere recitation of a 
“benign” or legitimate purpose for a racial classification is entitled to little or no weight.’ . . . 
Strict scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a school’s assertion that its admissions process 
uses race in a permissible way without a court giving close analysis to the evidence of how the 
process works in practice.”16 
In an effort to meet this standard, UT utilized a “holistic” admissions review process 
comprising several factors, including “personal achievement . . . test scores, or other unique 
skills” and “differences in life experiences.”17 Among these different experiences was “the 
experience of being a minority in a majority-white or majority-minority school and succeeding in 
that environment [which] offers a rich pool of potential UT Austin students with demonstrated 
qualities of leadership and sense of self.”18 In Fisher II the Court stated that  
the University identifies the educational values it seeks to realize through its 
admissions process: the destruction of stereotypes, the “ ‘promot[ion of] cross-
racial understanding,’ ” the preparation of a student body “ ‘for an increasingly 
diverse workforce and society,’ ” and the “ ‘cultivat[ion of] a set of leaders with 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.’ ” . . .  Later in the proposal, the University 
explains that it strives to provide an “academic environment” that offers a “robust 
exchange of ideas, exposure to differing cultures, preparation for the challenges of 
an increasingly diverse workforce, and acquisition of competencies required of 
future leaders.” . . .  All of these objectives, as a general matter, mirror the 
“compelling interest” this Court has approved in its prior cases.19 
                                                          
13 Id. at 2208, citing Fisher I at 2419-20. See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (“such classifications are 
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests”). 
14  Id. at 2211. 
15 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality 
opinion). 
16 Fisher I 133 S.Ct. at 2421. 
17 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas,758 F.3d 633, 653 (2014). 
18 Id.  
19 Fisher II, 136 S.Ct. at 2211 (internal citations omitted). 
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The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s finding that, in UT’s admissions 
decisions, “race is but a ‘factor of a factor of a factor.’”20 Further, the Court found that the 
plaintiff had failed to identify any race-neutral admissions process that could fulfill UT’s 
diversity goals.21 It therefore upheld the constitutionality of UT’s admissions program. 
The scope of the Court’s review of that program was circumscribed, however, by the 
plaintiff’s limited challenge to it. The dissenting opinion by Justice Alito noted several problems 
with the studies presented by UT to document the educational benefits of its holistic review 
process.22 However, the majority noted that Fisher had not challenged the adequacy of these 
studies, and it declined to consider the evidence cited by Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion 
because, inter alia, UT had had no opportunity to respond to that evidence.23 
Among the issues that the plaintiff’s limited challenge avoided was the meaning of the 
concept of a “critical mass” of minority students which UT claimed that it needed. The majority 
stated that plaintiff argued that “the University must set forth more precisely the level of 
minority enrollment that would constitute a ‘critical mass.’”24 The majority viewed this as a 
demand for a precise number, which it considered improper because “ the University is 
prohibited from seeking a particular number or quota of minority students.”25  
Likewise, the Court never discussed just how much weight UT gave to race. In Grutter 
the Court said that race may not be used “in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the 
defining feature of his or her application.”26 The majority in Fisher II found that in UT’s process 
“race is but a ‘factor of a factor of a factor,’”27 but it said nothing about how much weight that 
factor was actually given. Evidently plaintiff did not raise that question. A fortiori, the Court did 
not discuss how much weight may be given to race. 
Further, the Court did not inquire whether UT used non-racial admissions criteria in a 
race-neutral way. In Grutter the Court said that the University of Michigan Law School gave 
consideration for, inter alia, “admittees who have lived or traveled widely abroad, are fluent in 
                                                          
20 Fisher II, 136 S.Ct at 2208, quoting the district court opinion, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 608 (W.D. Tex. 
2009). 
21 136 S.Ct. at 2211-12. 
22 136 S.Ct. at 2215-16, 2219-20, 2226-29, 2239-40 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
23 Fisher II, 136 S.Ct. at 2211-12. It seems that the plaintiffs in Grutter also failed to raise the issue of the 
empirical validity of the school’s use of race in admissions in order to attain educational benefits. The 
majority opinion in Grutter discussed the design of the school’s admissions reviews. 539 U.S. at 334-41. 
However, the Court mentioned no studies to determine whether the school’s program had actually 
achieved the intended benefits of diversity. 
24 Fisher II, 136 S.Ct. at 2210. 
25 Id. 
26 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. 




several languages, have overcome personal adversity and family hardship, have exceptional 
records of extensive community service, and have had successful careers in other fields.”28 UT 
did not show whether these factors were applied in a race-neutral way; how much weight these 
factors received; or whether in practice educational benefits were actually realized by inclusion 
of these factors. 
The majority tacitly acknowledged the limited scope of its holding in Fisher II. While it 
sustained UT’s program, it imposed on the university a continuing duty, inter alia, “to identify 
the effects, both positive and negative, of the affirmative-action measures it deems necessary. . . . 
.  It is the University’s ongoing obligation to engage in constant deliberation and continued 
reflection regarding its admissions policies.”29 
Fisher II thus leaves open how a court should proceed if a plaintiff questions the 
educational benefits of a particular university’s race-conscious admissions program. Fisher II 
and its predecessors make clear that the program is subject to “strict scrutiny” and that “no 
deference is owed when determining whether the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve the 
university’s permissible goals.”30 Further, those goals “must be sufficiently measurable to permit 
judicial scrutiny of the policies adopted to reach them.”31 What evidence must a university 
produce to satisfy this standard? Part II looks to the research on judgment and decision-making 
for insights about how a selection process can best be designed and later checked for validity. 
Part III applies this research to university admissions programs.  
II. University Admission Procedures in Light of the Judgment and Decision-Making 
Literature 
A. Holistic ratings 
The judgment and decision-making [“JDM”] literature on evaluation makes a distinction 
between holistic ratings and disaggregated ratings. As an example, the Olympic ice skating 
competition was once judged using two criteria: presentation and technical merit, each criteria 
being judged on a 1 to 6 scale. Because each criterion was scored separately, this would be 
termed a “disaggregated” rating scheme. In such schemes the disaggregated ratings are 
eventually combined in some mathematical manner to yield a final score. For example, each of 
the two disaggregated ratings could first be multiplied by a weight to indicate the importance the 
Olympic committee thought should be attached to each criterion, and then those two resulting 
products could be added together.  Had the judges instead provided only a single score that 
reflected their attempt to take into account both criteria in some way, this would have been a 
“holistic” rating scheme. 
                                                          
28 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338. 
29 Id. at 2215. 
30 Id. at 2208. 
31 Id. at 2211. 
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The University of Texas at Austin has used a “Personal Achievement Score” (PAS) in its 
evaluation of applicants. This score is graded on a 1 to 6 scale, and is “ . . . determined by a 
separate reader, who (1) rereads the applicant’s required essays, (2) reviews any supplemental 
information the applicant submits (letters of recommendation, resumes, an additional optional 
essay, writing samples, artwork, etc.), and (3) evaluates the applicant’s potential contributions to 
the University’s student body based on the applicant’s leadership experience, extracurricular 
activities, awards/honors, community service, and other ‘special circumstances.’ ‘Special 
circumstances’ include the socioeconomic status of the applicant’s family, the socioeconomic 
status of the applicant’s school, the applicant’s family responsibilities, whether the applicant 
lives in a single-parent home, the applicant’s SAT score in relation to the average SAT score at 
the applicant’s school, the language spoken at the applicant’s home, and, finally, the applicant’s 
race.”32  All of these factors are potential inputs into the 1-6 PAS score. Thus the PAS certainly 
qualifies as a holistic rating. “Holistic ratings” in the research literature does not mean 
“considering relevant factors other than academic credentials.” The research literature contains 
no objections whatsoever to that strategy. However the literature is very skeptical about the 
wisdom of using holistic ratings that amalgamate unmeasured components into a single score. 
The following are the major conclusions derived from the research literature concerning holistic 
versus disaggregated ratings. 
Conclusion #1: Disaggregated ratings often make more accurate predictions than do 
holistic ratings.  
A very substantial amount of JDM research has compelled the conclusion that the use of 
disaggregated ratings often makes significantly more accurate predictions than do holistic 
ratings.33  Grove et al. performed a meta-analysis, which is a technique that combines the results 
of a multitude of research papers pertaining to the same topic. The researchers combined 136 
studies in their meta-analysis in order to compare the ability of holistic and disaggregated ratings 
to predict outcomes in an extremely wide variety of fields including medicine, student admission 
decisions, sales, and many other fields. The results were as follows: In approximately 46% of the 
studies examined, depending on the specific analysis, the process of arithmetically combining 
disaggregated ratings outperformed intuitive holistic prediction.  For 48% of the studies the two 
techniques yielded the same performance. For 6% of the studies the intuitive holistic procedure 
was superior, although the majority of these were superior by only a very small amount.  
One of the first demonstrations of the superiority of disaggregated ratings over holistic 
ratings was done by Dawes.34 As a member of the University of Oregon Department of 
Psychology, Dawes had access to the holistic ratings the clinical psychology faculty had given to 
applicants to that graduate program. He also had access to the faculty’s rating of each accepted 
                                                          
32 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2206 (2016). 
33 William M. Grove et al., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-analysis, 12 PSYCHOL. 
ASSESS. 19 (2000). 
34 Robyn M. Dawes, A Case Study of Graduate Admissions: Application of Three Principles of Human 
Decision Making, 26 AM. PSYCH. 180 (1971). 
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student’s progress after the first year of graduate school. Note that the admissions committee 
contained only Ph.D. professional clinical psychologists, who are professionally trained to 
evaluate personal factors—more trained than are members of any college admissions committee. 
Nevertheless, the correlation between the rating given to each accepted student’s application and 
the evaluation of the student after a year in the program was only .19. This means that the 
clinicians’ rating of the admission materials accounted for only about 3.6% of the variation 
among the students’ first-year graduate school performance. However, a simple amalgamation of 
each student’s GPA, Graduate Record Examination score, and the quality of the undergraduate 
institution attended was correlated .38 with each student’s first-year graduate school 
performance. Thus when these three disaggregated scores were combined, they quadrupled the 
amount of variance accounted for compared to the clinicians’ holistic ratings of the 
applications.35 This means that the amalgamation of the three disaggregated scores was a 
drastically better predictor of the students’ first year evaluation than were the clinicians’ ratings 
of the admissions materials. Several studies examining personal evaluations and predictions, 
including many pertaining to the accuracy of predictions made in legal testimony, have come to 
the same conclusion.36  For years scholars have commented on the stark contrast between the 
Supreme Court’s insistence on holistic evaluations and the research literature’s denigration of 
such ratings.37 
The first and most important conclusion supported by the JDM literature is that 
disaggregated ratings actuarially amalgamated by a simple mathematical formula often are 
superior to holistic ratings, even when the holistic ratings are done by experts. We wish to 
emphasize that such analyses are easy to do. Undergraduate research courses employ “canned” 
programs that perform such analyses. 
Conclusion #2: Decision makers are insufficiently aware of the bases for their 
decisions. 
In the JDM literature “self-insight” is a term that refers to the extent to which a decision 
maker is able to articulate accurately the bases for his or her decision.  The research literature 
suggests that self-insight is very poor. We emphasize that we do not imply that when a decision 
                                                          
35 By squaring the correlation one obtains the amount of variance accounted for:  4(.19)2 = (.38)2. 
36 Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE 1668 (1989). 
37 See Margaret E. Brooks et al., Distinction Bias in Applicant Reactions to Using Diversity Information 
in Selection, 17 INT’L J. SELECT. & ASSESS. 377, 378 (2009): “In the most Supreme Court case dealing 
directly with this issue, the Court mandated a more holistic approach to affirmative action—despite 
evidence that mechanical methods of combining data consistently outperform holistic approaches.” See 
also Scott Highhouse & John A. Kostech, Holistic Assessment for Selection and Placement, in K. F. 
Geisinger (Ed.), APA HANDBOOK OF TESTING AND ASSESSMENT IN PSYCHOLOGY: VOL I. TEST THEORY 
AND TESTING AND ASSESSMENT IN INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 565 (2013). 
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maker is inaccurate in describing his or her decision-making policy, he or she is necessarily 
being duplicitous. The literature suggests a lack of awareness, not a lack of honesty.38 
Examples abound. Elstein and colleagues39  asked a group of 50 physicians to participate 
in research designed to ascertain when hormonal replacement therapy should be used for post-
menopausal women. The group of 50 included 25 gynecologists and 25 family physicians. Each 
physician rated their own likelihood of prescribing estrogen to women in each of 12 case 
descriptions. Each physician also provided their estimates of the probability of each of the 
possible outcomes, the utility of each of those outcomes, and the importance of each of the 
outcome categories. From each physician’s ratings of these factors it was easy to ascertain what 
estrogen replacement recommendation should be compelled for each case by each physician. The 
results were that the recommendations based on the physician’s own ratings of the various 
factors were poorly related to the recommendation actually rendered by each physician for each 
of the 12 cases! In other words, the final decision was not well described by each physician’s 
own stated policy. 
The analogous finding has also been found in legal contexts. For example, Dhami and 
Ayton40 examined the bail versus jail decisions of 81 magistrates in the United Kingdom.  Each 
magistrate stated what factors he or she considered in making each decision and how much 
weight was placed on each factor. From a simple regression analysis the authors were able to 
ascertain which factors actually influenced each magistrate’s decision and how much weight was 
placed on each factor. The results were that the bases of the actual decisions corresponded poorly 
to both the stated policy and to “the ideal practice as defined by the due process model of 
justice.”41 The magistrates could not accurately articulate the true bases of their own decisions. 
The analogous result has also been found when abstract stimuli were used and where there would 
therefore be no reason to be dishonest or motivation to conform to any particular policy.42 
Conclusion #3: Disaggregating a holistic rating allows one to discern the policy 
underlying the holistic rating; thus disaggregated ratings promote transparency 
Given that it is so difficult to articulate accurately the bases of one’s evaluations and 
decisions, disaggregating a holistic rating into its components can perform the very valuable 
                                                          
38 Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental 
Processes, 84 PSYCH. REV. 231 (1977). 
39 Arthur S. Elstein et al., Comparison of Physicians’ Decisions Regarding Estrogen Replacement 
Therapy for Menopausal Women and Decisions Derived from a Decision Analytic Model, 80 AM. J. MED. 
246 (1986). 
40 Mandeep K. Dhami & Peter Ayton, Bailing and Jailing the Fast and Frugal Way, 14 J. BEHAV. 
DECISION MAKING 141 (2001). 
41 Id. at 141. 
42 Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Comparison of Bayesian and regression approaches to the study of 
information processing in judgment, 6 ORGAN. BEHAV. HUMAN PERF. 649 (1971). 
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function of revealing which components—if any—are responsible for the holistic rating. The 
following example illustrates this point in an educational setting. 
The National Science Foundation (NSF) provides funding for doctoral students to 
complete their dissertations.43 Students submit proposals, and within each discipline a panel of 
experts is convened to evaluate each proposal and decide which ones merit funding. Such 
financial support is often essential for graduate students who have to do fieldwork in a foreign 
country, for example.  
The General Accounting Office (GAO) had criticized NSF and two other funding 
agencies for allowing informal and unwritten criteria to pollute panels’ funding 
recommendations.44 Dissertation proposals were supposed to be evaluated according to the 
following four criteria: methodology, quality of the student’s training, utility of the research, and 
the theoretical basis of the research.45 Panelists had to provide only one holistic rating rather than 
provide a rating indicating how well each proposal satisfied each of the four criteria. I (HRA) 
asked the relevant program officer to ask the panelists to do both types of ratings: provide a 
holistic rating for each proposal and provide disaggregated ratings for each criterion. Using a 
simple regression analysis, I merely regressed the ratings of each panelist on the individual 
criteria on that panelist’s overall rating. Table 1 contains the results of this analysis.  The 
“Multiple R” column indicates that the holistic rating of three of the four panelists  
 
was overwhelmingly determined by the ratings given to the four criteria, although not all four 
criteria’s ratings contributed significantly to the holistic one. In particular, no panelist’s rating of 
a proposal’s theory contributed significantly to their overall holistic rating. Note that Panelist 
#2’s ratings of the four criteria were far less deterministic of the holistic rating than was the case 
for the other panelists. The program officer had been suspicious of this panelist’s rating 
performance, and this analysis confirmed his suspicions.  There were two possible reasons why 
Panelist #2’s criterion ratings and holistic rating were not closely related. First, Panelist #2 might 
                                                          
43 Special Programs for Graduate Students, at https://www.nsf.gov/funding/education.jsp?fund_type=2. 
44 United States General Accounting Office, Peer Review: Reforms Needed to Ensure Fairness in Federal 
Agency Grant Selection, GAO/PEMD-94-1 at 83. 
45 Reprinted from Hal R. Arkes, The Nonuse of Psychological Research at Two Federal Agencies, 14 
PSYCH. SCI. 1 (2003). 
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have been trying to use the four legitimate criteria but did so inconsistently. Second, this panelist 
may have been basing her holistic rating on illegitimate criteria, a prohibited behavior that had 
drawn the disapproval of the GAO. By using disaggregated ratings, the program officer was able 
to discern whether and to what extent every panelist was using each of the four criteria approved 
by the National Science Board. This is another enormous advantage of disaggregated over 
holistic ratings. 
Compare the transparency of this disaggregated analysis with the procedure of The 
University of Texas at Austin (UTA), the defendant in Fisher. UTA uses a “Personal 
Achievement Score” (PAS) to help determine who will be admitted to the University. As 
mentioned earlier, this score includes demonstrated leadership qualities, extracurricular 
activities, honors and awards, work experience, community service and a variety of special 
circumstances. The special circumstances in turn  include the socioeconomic status of the 
applicant’s family (parents’ education and combined income); whether the applicant is from a 
single-parent home; whether a language other than English is primarily spoken in the applicant’s 
home; special family responsibilities; the socioeconomic status of the applicant’s high school; 
the average SAT/ACT score of students attending the applicant’s high school in relation to the 
applicant’s own score; and beginning with applications for the 2005 entering class, the 
applicant’s race or ethnicity.46 
If a reader of an applicant’s file gives a PAS rating of 4, for example, it is not possible to 
know what might be the basis for that rating. Was the work experience particularly influential in 
deciding upon that rating? Perhaps it was the applicant’s race. Perhaps the reader detected a 
propensity for leadership. It is impossible to know. However, if the reader were forced to provide 
disaggregated ratings for each component of the PAS, it would be readily apparent what the 
bases of the holistic rating would be. Disaggregated ratings strongly promote transparency. 
Holistic ratings are completely opaque with regard to the influence of any component upon the 
holistic rating. 
B. Possible objections to the use of disaggregated ratings 
Given the advantages of disaggregated ratings, or equivalently, the disadvantages of 
holistic ratings, what could be possible objections to the use of the former over the latter?  
Possible Objection #1: Numbers are dehumanizing. 
This has been the traditional objection to the use of numerical ratings on any aspect of a 
person’s characteristics or behavior.47 However the University of Texas, for example, already 
uses numerical ratings, such as the 1-6 PAS score, among others. It is true that disaggregating a 
holistic rating into its components requires more numbers than does a single holistic rating. 
Unless the number of digits used is linearly related to the magnitude of dehumanization, 
                                                          
46 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
47 William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Replies to Commonly Heard Objections to Actuarial Judgment, 2 
PSY. PUB. POLICY & L. 293 (1996). 
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disaggregation should not result in any more dehumanization than does the current usage of 
ratings by universities. It should be acknowledged that making better decisions about applicants 
is more humanizing than making inaccurate decisions about applicants, and the research 
evidence is quite clear that disaggregated ratings generally foster more accurate decisions.  
Possible Objection #2: One cannot put numbers on one’s private thoughts. 
It strikes some people as inappropriate to assign ratings to components of a holistic 
rating. Some people think that the holistic rating comes about through a cognitive process that is 
inaccessible to conscious consideration and measurement. However, one’s unconscious 
consideration to create a holistic rating and one’s conscious assignment of a number to each 
component are functionally identical. The only difference is that the former is done implicitly 
and the latter is done explicitly. When one mentally creates a single holistic rating, one is tacitly 
considering each component to some unknown degree. The disaggregated technique simply 
requires that one express what one normally does implicitly. This expression makes the process 
transparent and thereby accessible to others and even to oneself.  
Possible Objection #3: Disaggregated ratings don’t take into account statistical 
interactions. 
This is an esoteric statistical objection. Suppose that in the eyes of an admissions officer 
an applicant’s being in many extracurricular activities would be a “plus” if the applicant did not 
have to earn income to care for other family members, but would be a “minus” if the applicant 
did have to earn income to care for other family members. This would comprise a statistical 
interaction between these two factors of the PAS; the presence (or absence) of a factor 
(extracurricular participation) would mean something different depending on the level of another 
factor (care of family members). Although a multiple regression analysis can detect such 
interactive relations between multiple variables, critics might argue that interactions between 
more than two variables would become so statistically complicated that it would be better to rely 
on each admission officer’s expert holistic consideration of such complexities. However research 
has shown that human decision makers are unable to discern or use such complicated relations to 
any substantial extent when evaluating stimuli.48 Therefore the basis for this objection has been 
undermined by empirical research. 
Possible Objection #4: People prefer holistic ratings; therefore they should be used. 
There is no doubt that people prefer holistic ratings over disaggregated ones.49 However 
it is irrational to prefer a technique that makes less accurate predictions over one that makes 
more accurate predictions.  
                                                          
48 Berndt Brehmer & A. Brehmer, What Have We Learned About Human Judgment From Thirty Years of 
Policy Capturing? in B. Brehmer and C.R. Joyce (Eds.), HUMAN JUDGMENT: THE SOCIAL JUDGMENT 
THEORY VIEW 75 (1988). 
49 Hal R. Arkes et al., Assessing the Merits and Faults of Holistic and Disaggregated Judgments, 23 J. 
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 250 (2010). See also Joseph Eastwood et al., What People Want From Their 
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At least two reasons exist why people prefer the less accurate technique. First, people 
think that they have more control over holistic ratings. With disaggregated ratings, the final 
amalgamated rating is compelled by the components’ ratings. Occasionally people don’t like the 
result of the amalgamation.  Raters may be unpleasantly surprised when their own ratings of the 
components yield an unwanted or unexpected result. Second, holistic ratings allow people to 
effectively disguise the bases for their decisions. If Panelist #2 in the NSF example above were 
basing her rating on some illegitimate factor, the holistic rating would be an ideal way to hide 
this corrupt behavior. On the other hand, with disaggregated ratings Panelist #2 could be asked, 
for example, why her rating of the dissertation methodology was so low. With disaggregated 
ratings the decision to downgrade a dissertation proposal would have to be manifested in a low 
rating given to at least one of the components, and a justification for this low rating could then be 
requested. 
C. Self-Report Measures  
Many of the studies purportedly supportive of diversity have used self-report measures. 
The serious problem with such research can be exemplified by a pair of studies by Conway and 
Ross.50 The authors assessed the impact of a study skills course in two different experiments. 
The course was totally worthless with regard to improving any measure of academic 
performance. However, students in both experiments (a) misremembered their starting skills as 
worse than they really were and (b) judged their study skills to have improved significantly 
thanks to the course. The students assumed that by taking a study skills course their study skills 
had improved. 
Now consider the amicus brief by Professor Gurin filed in the two Michigan cases.51  In 
the Cooperative Institutional Research Program research study discussed in the amicus brief, 
diversity was defined by a student’s enrollment in an ethnic studies course in college. These 
students were asked to self-report changes in such factors as general knowledge and ability to 
think critically. As veteran university professors, we suggest that students are not particularly 
accurate judges of whether they are generally knowledgeable and able to think critically. (If they 
were, there would be no need for any tests.) As was the case for the participants in the study 
skills course examined by Conway and Ross, the participants in the ethnic studies course were 
not in an unbiased position to assess their growth in various areas.  Naturally the students 
assumed that they had improved. In general, unverified self-report measures of improvement are 
                                                          
Professionals: Attitudes Toward Decision-making Strategies, 25 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 458 
(2012). 
50 Michael Conway & Michael Ross, Getting What You Want By Revising What You Had, 47 J. 
PERSONAL & SOC. PSYCH. 738 (1984). 
51 Gratz. v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
13 
 
fraught with difficulties, especially when improvement represents a socially desirable response 
that the respondent knows will be well received.52 
There is an irony in relying on self-reports to support the diminution of prejudice 
purportedly caused by diversity. Many researchers in the domain of prejudice insist that relying 
on self-report measures of one’s own prejudice are poor indictors of true bigotry, because people 
are either unwilling to disclose or unaware of the presence of their own prejudice.53  However 
proponents of diversity frequently rely on self-report measures to support the purported benefits 
of diversity.  
 
III. Do Current Policies Satisfy the Law? 
To reiterate, the Supreme Court says that race discrimination in school admissions is 
subject to strict scrutiny. “Strict scrutiny requires the university to demonstrate with clarity that 
its ‘purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the 
classification is necessary . . . to the accomplishment of its purpose.’”54  Further, the use of race 
must be “narrowly tailored to achieve the university’s permissible goals.”55 “The purpose of the 
narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure that ‘the means chosen “fit” . . . th[e] compelling goal 
so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate 
racial prejudice or stereotype.’”56  
The majority in Fisher II did not consider whether UT satisfied this standard because 
plaintiff did not raise the issue.57 The judgment and decision-making (“JDM”) literature shows 
                                                          
52 See Douglas P. Crowne and David Marlowe, A New Scale of Social Desirability Independent of 
Psychopathology, 24 J. CONSULT PSYCH. 349 (1960); Thomas E. Wood & Malcolm J. Sherman, 
Supplement to Race and Higher Education: Why Justice Powell’s Diversity Rationale for Racial 
Preferences in Higher Education Must Be Rejected, National Association of Scholars, 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED455755.pdf, at p. 4:”Students who take ethnic studies courses or attend 
a racial workshop may be more likely to know what the approved attitudes or behaviors are, and thus to 
report them.” 
53 Brian A. Nosek, et al., Math = Me, Me = Female, Therefore Math Is Not Equal To Me, 83 J. PERSONAL 
& SOC. PSYCH. 44, 55 (2002): “A stereotype may be maintained outside conscious awareness although it 
is neither wanted nor endorsed consciously, yet still influence both consciously and unconsciously held 
attitudes.” 
54 Fisher II at 2208, quoting Fisher I at 133 S.Ct. at 2418. 
55 Id. at 2203, citing Fisher I at 2419-20. See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (“such classifications are 
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests”). 
56 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality 
opinion). 
57 Fisher II, 136 S.Ct. at 2211-12. 
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that methods like those used in Fisher do not meet this standard and therefore do not satisfy strict 
scrutiny. 
A. Holistic Ratings Do Not “Demonstrate with Clarity” but Instead Obscure Underlying 
Policies 
Because UT Austin uses holistic rather than disaggregated ratings, the actual admissions 
policy is largely opaque. Thus detailed judicial scrutiny of the policy is impossible.  We are not 
the first to note this deficiency. Zell  bluntly stated that “. . . the sole guiding principle behind the 
holistic-admissions system is that this system allows colleges to accept—and to reject—
whomever they desire and then to hide the reasons for their decision.”58 Justice Ginsburg hinted 
at this feature of holistic ratings: “As for holistic review, if universities cannot explicitly include 
race as a factor, many may ‘resort to camouflage’ to ‘maintain their minority enrollment.’”59 
Holistic ratings are ideally suited for “camouflage.” UCLA law professor Richard Sander 
explained how many law school faculty wanted to exploit the opacity of holistic ratings after the 
citizens of California passed Proposition 209 banning racial preferences: “Some faculty observed 
that admissions decision in many graduate departments rested on so many subjective criteria that 
it would be easy to make the continued consideration of race invisible to outsiders.”60 Holistic 
evaluations eliminate any easy way to detect such defiance of Proposition 209 or any other law 
or court ruling. 
Zell noted that when Jewish applicants started outscoring “blue blood” applicants in the 
1920s, the elite Eastern universities began to use non-academic criteria such as “character” to 
screen out the former in favor of the latter, a procedure currently alleged to be used against Asian 
students.61 Harvard President Lowell advised against applying “character” to both Jewish and 
Gentile applicants.62 “Both to employ a double standard and then to hide its use, a university 
could find no more effective tool than the holistic admissions system.”63 With disaggregated 
ratings it would have been extremely easy, for example, to ascertain if Gentiles were 
disproportionately given extra points for “character.”  Today it would similarly be extremely 
easy to ascertain if students from one demographic group are disproportionately given extra 
                                                          
58 Jonathan R. Zell, It’s Not About Race: The True Purpose of the University of Texas’ Holistic-
Admissions System Is to Give Preferences to Well-Connected White Applicants, Not To Disadvantaged 
Minorities, 24, U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 35, 68 (2016). 
59 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 
304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). Justice Souter also suggested that universities may try to obfuscate their 
illegitimate use of race. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).   
60 Heather MacDonald, California Passed an Anti-Affirmative Action Law, and Colleges Ignored It, 
https://nypost.com/2018/09/01/california-passed-an-anti-affirmative-action-law-and-colleges-ignored -it/  
downloaded 3/2/19. 
61 Zell, supra note 58, at 57. 
62 Id. at 69. 
63 Id. at 76 
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points on non-academic characteristics in order to inflate their Personal Achievement Scores 
(“PAS”). UT admitted that if it had relied on standardized test scores alone, almost all of the 
applicants admitted would have been White.64 This implies that minorities were rated higher than 
Whites on the non-academic factors that were the inputs into the PAS. With disaggregated 
ratings it would be easy to ascertain if, compared to Whites, minorities were deemed to have 
manifested much more leadership, for example. In a current lawsuit Asian students assert that 
non-academic factors are being used to diminish their chances of being admitted to Harvard.65  
With disaggregated ratings, the impact of each non-academic factor can be unambiguously 
assessed. 
In addition to providing greater transparency, disaggregated ratings offer better 
institutional control over the ratings process. With holistic ratings, the admissions administration 
cannot tell with any precision how much weight each rater gives to each factor; the raters, who 
are students or low-level employees, have wide discretion. However, universities claim that they 
have a “compelling interest” in attaining the educational benefits of diversity, as indeed they 
must in order to satisfy the constitutional requirements for engaging in race-conscious 
admissions.66 If affirmative action is so important, administrators should exercise tight control 
over how it is implemented rather than delegating broad discretion to subordinates. The motives 
of a school that fails to do so should be considered suspect. 
The use of race in college admissions has been described by UT Austin admissions 
officers and by the courts at various times as merely a “factor of a factor of a factor,67 a “plus 
factor,”68 and as a factor that can “tip the balance.”69 Fortunately there exist data that can test the 
accuracy of these characterizations. “[I]n data from 40 law schools gathered from their 2005-
2007 admissions cycles, the median odds ratio on black compared to white admissions was 
150—meaning black applicants had far greater odds of admission than white applicants.”70 
When one group has 150 times the likelihood of being admitted compared to another group, we 
suggest that this is not merely a thumb that can tip the balance scale but a bowling ball on the 
                                                          
64 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 758 F 3rd at 647: “Given the test score gaps between minority and non-
minority applicants, if holistic review was not designed to evaluate each individual’s contributions to UT 
Austin’s diversity, including those that stem from race, holistic admissions would approach an all-white 
enterprise.” 
65 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard Corporation), 
Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-14176-ADB. 
66 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (“Today, we hold that the Law School has a 
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.”). 
67 Fisher II, 136 S.Ct. at 2207. 
68 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-21 (1978). 
69 Id. at 316. 
70 Robert Steinbuch, A Different Take On Why Law Schools Are Not Admitting More Black Students, 
NAT’L JURIST, at www.national jurist.com/national-jurist-magazine/different-take-why-law-schools-are-
not-admitting-more-black-students, downloaded 3/2/19. 
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balance scale.71 Race is not being used just as a “tie-breaker.” Holistic ratings effectively 
disguise the true policy. When the Supreme Court opined that “it is not a failure of narrow 
tailoring for the impact of racial consideration to be minor,”72 it was not apprised of the actual 
quantitative magnitude of the racial consideration. UT failed to do that analysis. 
Of course, holistic ratings completely hide the measurement of each of the criteria upon 
which the holistic rating is based. In his dissent Justice Alito repeatedly criticized UT Austin for 
not keeping data and also for failing to analyze data they already have in their possession.73  Such 
data and their analysis would have enabled UT to answer critical questions about whether 
various diversity factors within the PAS had their intended effect and whether “holistic 
admittees” had even enrolled in classes lacking in diversity. UT Austin admitted that it does not 
keep any statistics on the impact of their holistic racial admission system!74 
B. Proving the Educational Benefits of Diversity 
1. Measurement of the purported benefits. 
Many of the purported educational benefits of diversity would have been extremely easy 
to assess. For example, the Supreme Court opined that “student body diversity promotes learning 
outcomes.”75 UT Austin could have given standardized tests to students in multiple instances of 
the same course but which varied in the diversity of the enrolled students.  Both UT and 
outsiders (like courts) could then compare the knowledge gained in the various instances.  Does 
diversity result in greater gains in learning? UT produced absolutely no evidence whatsoever that 
its diversity admissions program had fostered the educational benefits that UT had listed as its 
goals. Perhaps the program had fostered these goals; perhaps it had not. This is a question that 
could have been easily answered empirically. 
In defending its admission policy, UT Austin explained that another benefit of diversity is 
to foster the “robust exchange of ideas.”76 One way to test whether diversity fosters the 
achievement of this goal is to tape record class sessions which differ in the diversity of the 
enrolled students. Ask neutral listeners to rate the liveliness of the discussions or the robustness 
of the exchange of ideas.  There already exists research evidence that might bear upon this issue. 
Many companies are very highly interested in the productivity and creativity of their work teams. 
The typical research finding on this topic is that diversity of knowledge among team members is 
                                                          
71 See Peter Arciadiacono & Michael Lovenheim, Affirmative Action and the Quality-Fit Trade-Off, 54 J 
ECON. LIT. 3, 12-13 (2016) [hereinafter “Arciadiacono & Lovenheim, Trade-Off”]; Peter Arciadiacono & 
Michael Lovenheim, Affirmative Action In Undergraduate Education, 7 ANN. REV. ECONS. 487, 495-96 
(2015).  
72 Fisher II at 2212. 
73 Id. at 2216, 2227, 2238 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
74 Id. at 2220. 
75 Fisher II, 136 S.Ct. at 2210, quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
76 Fisher II 136 S.Ct. at 2211. 
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an important facilitative factor but that diversity of ethnicity is not.77 Although the same 
phenomenon would not necessarily be found in college classroom discussions, these research 
findings do highlight the need of a college to document the benefits it claims in order to prove 
that its program is “narrowly tailored” and therefore satisfies strict scrutiny. 
 2. Assessing outcomes vs. self-reports of improvement.  
Because self-reports of one’s own improvement are highly suspect,78 there have been 
attempts to overcome this problem by using alternative measurement techniques.  The first is the 
indirect method. In their study Rothman and colleagues asked students, faculty, and 
administrators from 140 campuses no questions about diversity.79 Instead they asked the 
participants about their own campus’ environment and their own educational experience. These 
variables were then examined in relation to the enrollment diversity of their campus. The 
hypothesis to be tested, of course, was that more diversity on a campus would be correlated with 
positive educational and environmental outcomes. However the results “ . . . showed an inverse 
relationship between enrollment diversity and evaluations of educational quality by students, 
faculty, and administrators.”80 In other words, more diversity was related to less educational 
quality in the view of the students, faculty, and administrators. However “[a]mong faculty and 
administrators, enrollment diversity was significantly associated with reports of more positive 
treatment of minority students and less racial discrimination. But these findings were offset by 
the absence of similar results among students, who also reported more personal victimization as 
diversity increased.”81 
The most obvious way to avoid the self-report problem is to assess outcomes, not self-
reports. This is not a novel suggestion.82 Being licensed to practice is a critical outcome measure 
for aspiring physicians. So Kulatunga-Moruzi and Norman 51 examined the validity of various 
cognitive and non-cognitive criteria in predicting eventual performance of medical school 
applicants on the licensing examination of the Medical Council of Canada.83 Both the medical 
school application and the licensing examination have two components—cognitive and non-
                                                          
77 See Greg L. Stewart, A Meta-Analytic Review of Relationships Between Team Design Features and 
Team Performance, 32 J MGMT. 29 (2006); Sujin K. Horwitz & Irwin B. Horwitz, The Effects of Team 
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78 See supra notes 50 and accompanying text. 
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82 See Justin Pidot, Intuition or Proof: The Social Science Justification For The Diversity Rationale in 
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cognitive, the latter being sub-divided into measures of communication and problem-solving 
skills.  Having identical components implies that the medical school application and licensing 
examination are very well aligned. The results of the analyses were that the non-cognitive factors 
in the application were nearly worthless in predicting anything—cognitive or non-cognitive—on 
the licensing examination.  What saved the non-cognitive factors from a verdict of complete 
worthlessness was that the personal interview during the application process did predict the 
performance on the communication portion of the licensing examination. However, the 
standardized MCAT (Medical College Admissions Test) verbal reasoning score correlated with 
the communication portion of the licensing examination far better than did the interview score. 
Also of interest was that the autobiography portion of the admissions process predicted 
absolutely nothing on the licensing examination. This finding raises questions about the use of 
the personal essay in race-conscious admissions. 
UT Austin and other colleges and universities could use an important outcome measure 
such as graduation. Once an outcome measure is chosen, officials can then determine how to 
narrowly tailor the admissions procedure. For example, how does each component of the PAS 
separately influence the graduation rate? Do those whose PAS is boosted by having spoken a 
foreign language at home graduate at a higher rate than those whose PAS is not boosted by the 
presence of this factor? Such an analysis would allow the UT admissions officials to “tailor” the 
admissions procedure quite well, thus satisfying the Supreme Court’s requirement. UT’s or any 
other university’s admission committee could then include the factors that predict the outcome 
measure and discard from consideration the factors that don’t. Simple empirical analysis can 
answer such important questions, but UT officials seem unmotivated to perform such 
investigations.84 Without empirical analysis, unverified intuition is all that admissions officials 
can use. That does not satisfy strict scrutiny. 
As an example, UT Austin asserted that African-American students from privileged 
backgrounds “have great potential for serving as a ‘bridge’ in promoting cross-racial 
understanding, as well as in breaking down racial stereotypes.”85 The Texas Top Ten Percent 
Law grants admission to persons who finished in the top ten percent of their high school 
graduating class.  UT asserted that the minority students admitted in this manner were drawn 
from high schools the majority of whose students were minority students. UT Austin further 
asserted that these students often come from poor, disadvantaged families, and would be less 
able to break down racial stereotypes than would more affluent minorities who could be admitted 
using the “special circumstances” component of the PAS score.86  Is this intuition correct? There 
are plenty of validated tests of the propensity to stereotype.87 Do White students in classes with 
Top Ten Percent minority students show more stereotyping than do White students in classes 
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87 See Joshua Correll et al., Measuring Prejudice, Stereotypes and Discrimination, in THE SAGE 
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with more privileged minority students? These are all empirical questions whose answers should 
help craft the admissions process.88  There is no need to rely on intuition, which may be 
incorrect. 
Not only can the components of the PAS be examined empirically to tailor the admission 
process, the academic credentials can also be examined in this manner. In his classic text, The 
Nature of Prejudice, Gordon Allport extolled the benefits of inter-racial contact in diminishing 
stereotypes.89 This would seem to be an enormous benefit of diversity in admissions. However 
Allport cautioned that if the groups were of different status, this benefit would not be achieved 
and might even reverse.90  Consider the fact that the disclosure of the law school data at the 
University of Michigan revealed that the median African-American admitted student had an 
academic index at the second percentile of the White distribution.91 At the University of 
Wisconsin and the University of Virginia, the median African-American admitted student had an 
academic index below the first percentile of the White distribution.92 Thus at these three 
universities the two racial groups were unequal in the status of their academic credentials, clearly 
an important factor in their ensuing law school performance.93 Would the presence of such 
students reduce or exacerbate racial stereotyping? 
Some existing evidence suggests that the current practice of affirmative action actually 
worsens race relations, at least at highly selective schools. A study of 173 colleges and 
universities by the National Association of Scholars (“NAS”) has found that African-American 
students at many schools have demanded and received racially separate facilities, organizations, 
and programs.94 This development is the polar opposite of the traditional civil rights movement’s 
goal of racial integration. The NAS report speculates that this neo-segregation is a response to 
the mismatch of academic credentials between White and African-American students created by 
current affirmative action programs.95 
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This development also raises questions about UT’s claims, accepted by the Court 
majority in Fisher II, that its program was necessary to overcome “feelings of loneliness and 
isolation” experienced by minority students and to achieve a “critical mass” of minority 
students.96 Although affirmative action increases the number of minority students at a school, the 
increase does not seem to facilitate the increased integration of courses that UT said the “critical 
mass” was intended to achieve nor to overcome minority students’ “feelings of isolation and 
loneliness.” Rather, schools seem to have resorted to racial separation to address those feelings. 
The intuition of the admissions officials about the effects of the affirmative action 
programs may or may not be supported by more precise empirical data. Those data could provide 
guidance to such officials concerning the tailoring of the academic index threshold for admission 
in order to achieve the intended benefits of diversity as well as to satisfy judicial strict scrutiny. 
Conclusion 
The Court in Fisher II said that a university has an “ongoing obligation to engage in 
constant deliberation and continued reflection regarding its admissions policies.”97 Holistic 
admissions programs like those employed by the University of Texas-Austin in Fisher are 
opaque because they hide the significance given to such constitutionally crucial factors as the 
race of the applicant. In Fisher the Supreme Court did not consider this defect because plaintiffs 
did not raise the issue. In a case where the issue is properly raised, no university could 
reasonably assert that its holistic admission procedure is “narrowly tailored” so as to satisfy the 
Court’s requirement of strict scrutiny. The influence of any component of such a holistic 
program would be completely opaque and therefore impossible to scrutinize. 
In the university admissions process, even the best predictors bear only a probabilistic 
relation to the to-be-predicted event. Does coming from a home in which English is not the 
primary language foster or lessen the probability of graduation? As long as holistic ratings are 
used, admissions officers will never ascertain what specific factors promote academic success, 
and the courts will never be able to learn exactly what procedures are used by admissions 
officers. Assuming that (a) admissions offers do want to know what factors are related to 
academic success, and (b) courts do want to know factors are influential in admissions officers’ 
decisions, it is extremely easy to use disaggregated ratings to accomplish both goals. 
The use of race must be “narrowly tailored to achieve the university’s permissible 
goals.”98 “A university’s goals cannot be elusory or amorphous—they must be sufficiently 
measureable to permit judicial scrutiny of the policies adopted to reach them.”99 So Step 1 is to 
enunciate specific measurable goals. Graduation? GPA? These are examples of the to-be-
predicted event or predicted index. 
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Step 2 is not to give one overall rating after eyeballing a large number of potential 
factors. Step 2 should be to rate each and every factor under consideration. The research 
literature teaches us that humans are extremely poor at the daunting task of combining multiple 
probabilistic indicators.100 Employ a multiple regression equation to provide a clear and accurate 
answer as to what factors should be used and which should be ignored. Predictive accuracy will 
be enhanced, and the resulting process will be transparent to all. These are worthy goals, and 
they are easily within our reach. Admissions programs that do not follow such a process are not 
“narrowly tailored” and therefore should not be held to satisfy strict scrutiny. 
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